CROSS-BORDER JUDGMENTS AND THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION: SOLVING THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT
QUANDARY BY WAY OF TRIBAL COURTS
LINDSAY LOUDON VEST

†

INTRODUCTION
In their 1968 seminal survey on the “recognition of foreign adjudications,” Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman set
out five reasons attesting to the vital importance of recognizing judg1
ments rendered in foreign nations. The policies they highlighted
focused on efficiency, protection of the successful party, forum shopping, grant of authority to the more appropriate jurisdiction, and “an
interest in fostering stability and unity in an international order in
2
which many aspects of life are not confined to any single jurisdiction.”
Today, more than thirty-five years later, their reasoning rings true, as
the issues surrounding both the recognition and the enforcement of
3
foreign judgments have never been more salient. Breakthroughs in
real-time communication in the last twenty-five years are only one reason for ever-blurring borders between nations. As human action and
the need for efficiency increasingly demand that the judgments of one
country’s courts are recognized and enforced by other nations, there
†
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Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications:
A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1601-04 (1968).
2
Id. at 1603-04.
3
Recognition and enforcement are terms that reflect on the ability of a judgment
to survive in forums beyond its own boundaries. In the course of this Comment, I will
use both words to refer to the movement of judgments across borders. However, it is
important to be able to differentiate between the two terms because—although related—the concepts are distinct from one another. Recognition occurs when a court
“relies upon a foreign judicial ruling to preclude litigation of a particular claim, or
issue, on the ground that it has been previously litigated abroad.” GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 936 (3d ed. 1996). On the other hand, enforcement occurs when a court “affirmatively uses its coercive powers to compel a defendant . . . to satisfy a judgment
rendered abroad.” Id.
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is a common acknowledgment that ours must be a global legal system.
Despite the importance of establishing such a policy of general acceptance, the United States has yet to codify an agreement with any other
5
nation regarding the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
While the Brussels Convention has governed relations between the
6
courts of many European countries since 1968, the United States and
other countries that are members of the Hague Conference—and
therefore potential parties to a relevant convention—have yet to suc7
cessfully ratify an agreement on jurisdiction and judgments. The slow
4

As Professor Linda Silberman points out, a further benefit of a successful Hague
Convention rests on the fact that it would “build on the principle expressed in Article
220 of the Treaty of Rome that unification of markets goes together with mutual enforcement of judgments.” Linda J. Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project Be Saved?:
A Perspective from the United States, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS:
LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 159, 162 (John J. Barceló III & Kevin M. Clermont eds.,
2002); see also infra note 7 (discussing the Hague Conference).
5
In the 1970s, the United States entered into negotiations in an attempt to
achieve a treaty concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
with the United Kingdom, but the negotiations failed. BORN, supra note 3, at 938. For
further discussion of the unsuccessful convention, see P.M. North, The Draft U.K./U.S.
Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 219 (1979).
6
The 1968 Brussels Convention was the first international agreement employed to
broadly regulate standards of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments across borders. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, as amended, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. Often referred to in combination with the 1988 Lugano Convention, the Brussels Convention is in force between the member states of the European
Union, while the Lugano Convention, which is based on a practically identical framework, binds the latter as well as the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, as amended, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter
Lugano Convention].
7
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is “a global intergovernmental organisation” whose statutory purpose is “to work for the ‘progressive
unification’ of [private international law] rules.” HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INT’L LAW, OVERVIEW, at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26
(last visited Nov. 29, 2004). “The principal method used to achieve [progressive unification] consists in the negotiation and drafting of multilateral treaties or Conventions in
the different fields of private international law . . . .” HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INT’L LAW, MORE ABOUT HCCH, at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=text.
display&tid=4 (last visited Nov. 29, 2004). As of November 2004, sixty-four nations are
“member states” of the Hague Conference. A list of the member states and a list of
Hague Conventions to which each nation is either a signatory or a party are available at
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=states.listing.
In 1992, the Hague Conference initiated a project to write a worldwide convention
on territorial jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters. Though an initial Draft Convention was completed in 1999, there
has been much controversy and many setbacks, with the United States acting as a key
dissenter in discussions regarding that draft. Informal discussions have continued
since 1999, but there is no officially approved document as of yet. In this Comment,

2004]

CROSS-BORDER JUDGMENTS

799

pace of negotiations leading up to ratification is due in large part to
the difficulties member nations are facing in reaching an acceptable
conclusion regarding certain key issues before the Conference. One
such issue is rooted in the sometimes conflicting public policies and
associated legal predispositions of member nations.
Historically, many courts, both in the United States and abroad,
have reserved the right, either implicitly or statutorily, to refuse to
recognize a judgment from a foreign court if such judgment violates
important public policies of the recognizing state. The Brussels Convention is just one document that provides for such a public policy
8
exception. However, the possibility of crisis looms when public policies in forum nations are disparate enough that such an exception
9
threatens to become a catchall or “escape” provision. Though it is
widely accepted that the bar is high and that the public policy exception should not be used indiscriminately, it is generally at the discretion of the deciding court to determine whether or not the judgment
to be recognized clearly “undermine[s] the public interest, the public
confidence in the administration of the law, or security for individual
10
rights of personal liberty or of private property.” It is thus the case
that each court will apply the standard in a distinct way, and considered in the context of the proposed Hague Convention—where there
is no plan to establish an authority to oversee or review potential
abuses of such a provision—the fear of a public policy exception tak11
ing on a life of its own is a viable concern.
the jurisdiction and judgments project and all of the discussions associated with the
project will be referred to as “Hague Convention.” For a list of the current working
documents of the Hague Convention, see http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act+
progress.cats.
8
See Brussels Convention, supra note 6, tit. III, § 1, art. 27(1), 1998 O.J. (C 27) at
10 (“A judgment shall not be recognized: (1) if such recognition is contrary to public
policy in the State in which recognition is sought . . . .”). For examples of public policy
provisions in other documents, see discussion infra pp. 807-08 and notes 44 -47.
9
Robert Reuland describes the parallel public policy exception that is set out in
article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention as an “escape clause.” Robert C. Reuland, The
Recognition of Judgments in the European Community: The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the
Brussels Convention, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 559, 591 (1993).
10
Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986).
11
The Brussels Convention has dealt with this issue by enabling the European
Court of Justice to act as a supranational appellate body:
When the Brussels Convention was signed in 1968, the European Court of
Justice did not have the power to review jurisdictional issues. At that time, a
Joint Declaration was adopted committing the contracting states to study the
question of conferring jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice to interpret the Brussels Convention. In 1971, a Protocol was adopted that conferred
upon the European Court of Justice jurisdiction to give rulings on the inter-
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The United States is in a difficult position with regard to an international recognition and enforcement agreement. Despite an everincreasing need, the U.S. has never successfully been party to such an
agreement, whereas many of the European countries who would be
party to a Hague Convention are already signatories to the Brussels
Convention. Parties to the Brussels Convention have existing relationships, which suggests that they are unlikely to face the same level of
public policy apprehension with regard to one another. As a result,
many of the public policy concerns that stem from the proposed
Hague Convention are those implicating the U.S.—either as the forum where judgment was initially handed down or as the forum in
which a plaintiff seeks recognition. The situation is complicated by
the fact that the U.S. is left without a key negotiating chip because, in
comparison to other nations, the U.S. historically has been generous
12
in recognizing and enforcing judgments.
To best confront these obstacles, one must look to existing practices in the United States that present similar public policy issues.
The relationships between state courts are governed on both a constitutional and statutory level by the notion of “full faith and credit”
13
and, hence, do not allow for public policy exceptions. Therefore,
the movement of judgments from state to state has not encountered
the same problems presented by the movement of judgments between the U.S. and other countries. Because Indian tribes do not fit
into any of the categories governed by the Full Faith and Credit
14
Clause, the relationship between tribal courts and courts of the
United States, both state and federal, is similar to the relationship
pretations of the Convention.
Silberman, supra note 4, at 165 n.33 (referring to Brussels Convention, supra note 6,
Protocol, art. 1, 1998 O.J. (C 27) at 28).
For additional discussion on a supranational judiciary as a potential solution to
some of the problems encountered by the Hague Conference, see discussion infra Part
III.A.
12
For further discussion on reciprocity and foreign judgments, see Susan L. Stevens, Note, Commanding International Judicial Respect: Reciprocity and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 26 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 115 (2002)
(“While the United States has been generous in its recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, many foreign countries have been unwilling to honor U.S. judgments. Such disparity is due in part . . . to the tendency of U.S. courts to unilaterally
recognize and enforce foreign judgments.”).
13
The Full Faith and Credit Clause in the U.S. Constitution states that “Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Not a self-executing clause,
full faith and credit is implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
14
Though the majority of scholars agree that Indian tribes are not bound by full
faith and credit, there are scholars who argue otherwise. See infra note 17.
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between the courts of foreign nations. The cultural divide that gives
rise to differences in public policy between foreign nations is also apparent in the interactions between the United States and tribes.
Many of the same complications arise, and many of the same negotiations occur.
Part I of this Comment sets the stage for the analysis by outlining
pertinent aspects of the relationship between, first, tribal courts and
U.S. courts and, second, U.S. courts and courts of foreign nations. In
addition, Part I serves as an introduction to the public policy exception and the obstacle it presents when attempting to move judgments
across boundaries. Part II identifies some of the differences between
the relationship of the U.S. with tribal nations and the relationship of
the U.S. with foreign nations, and acknowledges the limitations of the
comparison. Part III introduces three potential solutions to the inherent dangers of a public policy exception, and Part IV discusses the
necessary process that the U.S. must undergo in order to successfully
adopt the most promising of the three solutions, a constitution-like
document that establishes a standard of public policy by which participating nations would be encouraged to abide.
I. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISPARATE COURTS
Indian tribes are recognized as sovereign entities separate from
15
the federal and state governments of the United States. The intricacies of the relationship between tribes and the state and federal governments are complex, the source of more than one scholarly analysis,
and not the purpose of this Comment. Rather, this Comment first
looks at the ways that the United States and tribal nations have
learned to coexist with regard to recognition of judgments. It then
employs that experience to develop a better understanding of how the
United States can apply the lessons learned within our own boundaries to the ongoing issues surrounding the recognition of foreign
judgments.

15

Indians did not participate in the Constitutional Convention and did not play a
role in the ratification of the Constitution. Though the Constitution does refer to
Indians in several different places within the document, it does so in a way that suggests that the constitutional compact is not otherwise binding on them. For example,
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 stipulates that the apportionment of representatives of the
House of Representatives excludes “Indians not taxed,” and Article I, Section 8, Clause
3 allows Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”

802

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 797

A. The Relationship Between Tribal Courts and the
Courts of the United States
To start, it is necessary to characterize the relationship between
tribal courts and the courts of the United States. Though the debate
is ongoing, it is generally accepted that the Full Faith and Credit
16
17
Clause does not apply to tribal courts. On a statutory level, legal
scholars have argued for the exclusion of tribes from the doctrine on a
number of fronts. First, § 1738, which implements the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, refers to states, territories, and possessions with no ref18
erence to tribes. Second, Congress has passed a number of statutes
that extend full faith and credit terms to the tribes on specific causes
19
of action.
Beyond the statutory evidence, there are practical reasons why full
faith and credit is not the most viable way to approach the movement
of judgments to and from tribal courts. As set out in the Constitution,
full faith and credit embraces res judicata and makes it the “uniform
law of the Union, thereby in large part creating the so-called ‘sister20
hood’ of the states as we know it.” By doing this, the doctrine succeeds
in achieving a symmetry between state courts that glosses over any cultural differences that exist among the respective states by making recognition of judgments a constant and dependable force. According to
16

See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause
found at Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution).
17
A majority of scholars agree that tribes are not bound by full faith and credit.
See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
841, 921 (1990) (concluding that “Indian tribal courts cannot reasonably expect the
laws and judgments of their tribe to be honored by federal and state courts if they consistently decline to discharge their federal statutory obligation to provide full faith and
credit to the laws and judgments of federal and state governments”). However, some
scholars still argue for tribal inclusion. See, e.g., Robert Laurence, The Convergence of
Cross-Boundary Enforcement Theories in American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full
Faith and Credit, Comity and Asymmetry, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 115 (1998) (arguing that
full faith and credit inclusion could be asymmetrical in order to allow tribal courts to
test the external judgments for conformity to tribal traditions).
18
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (“The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any
such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in
other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions . . . .”).
19
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (2000) (“The Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot
Nation, and the State of Maine shall give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of each other.”); id. § 1911(d) (obligating state courts to give full faith and credit
to tribal court judgments in certain child custody matters); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (2000)
(stating that state courts must give “full force and effect” to “[a]ny tribal ordinance or
custom . . . adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community . . . if not inconsistent with
any applicable civil law of the State . . . .”).
20
Laurence, supra note 17, at 120.
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the mandates of full faith and credit, “[r]ecognition or enforcement of
a sister state judgment is required even where the underlying claim is
contrary to the public policy of the state where enforcement is
21
sought.” The establishment of this type of “symmetrical” legal system
furthers the purpose of uniting the states into a cohesive nation, where
they coexist semi-independently under one overarching legal system.
In fact, full faith and credit, as set out in the Constitution, implemented
by § 1738, and interpreted by the courts, specifically disallows any depar22
ture on the basis of cultural differences or public policy. The full faith
and credit doctrine successfully created a homogeneous legal system.
However, the relationship between the U.S. and tribal nations is different from the union between sister states.
In an article examining the theories of tribal judgment enforcement, Professor Robert Laurence reasoned that “[s]ymmetry, reciprocity, retaliation and full faith and credit are all principles in furtherance of the overriding objectives of uniformity and sameness.
However, most everything we know about Indian law is affected by the
23
overriding concepts of variety and difference.” Tribal nations exist
separately within the boundaries of the United States in order to safe24
guard the differences that make them unique. It logically follows
that the theories upon which the laws of the states are built may not be
the same as those upon which the laws of a tribe are structured. Accordingly, to insist that a judgment issued in one forum is to be unquestionably enforced in the other forum would be to ignore the very
reasoning by which the courts were separated and given independent
status in the first place.
Rather, recognition of tribal court judgments in the courts of the
United States and recognition of U.S. court judgments in tribal courts
is more sensibly bound by a form of comity. Articulated in Hilton v.
21

BORN, supra note 3, at 937.
See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236-37 (1908) (holding that a judgment in
Missouri must be given the same credit, validity, and effect in Mississippi that it would
have received in the Missouri courts even though the laws and public policies of Mississippi prohibited the contracts and transaction on which the judgment was based);
Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290, 301-02 (1866) (holding that a Kentucky
judgment will have the same faith and credit in Mississippi notwithstanding that it was
contrary to Mississippi laws).
23
Laurence, supra note 17, at 137.
24
To emphasize that tribal courts should have more discretion than full faith and
credit allows, scholars point to differences including population, economic power,
systematic differences, and the issue of impact. See, e.g., id. (stating that “[t]ribal reluctance to enforce state judgments ought to be expected” because tribal societies, which
tend to be “small, homogeneous, old and fragile,” could be disrupted by enforcing a
judgment from a dominant society that is “large, diverse, young and sturdy”).
22
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25

Guyot, comity is defined as follows:
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
26
laws.

The doctrine of comity thus grants a court the discretion to recognize a foreign judgment without compelling it to do so.
Comity has created complications in both the tribal context and
the international context. The Hilton Court’s concept of comity
27
gave rise to the public policy exception in the United States. However, it remains a well-recognized danger that, if abused, a public
28
policy exception might “swallow the whole rule [of comity],” especially in a tribal setting. Still, in most states, judges applying comity
have the discretion to “take[] into account the many differences
among Indian tribes, especially in size and in the types of courts
29
they have.” The obvious risk is that judges—both on the tribal
court side and on the U.S. court side—will apply their own independent standards of public policy in restricting the recognition or
enforcement of outside judgments. That risk has been reduced, at
least partially, by the adoption of the Indian Civil Rights Act of
30
1968.

25

159 U.S. 113 (1895).
Id. at 163-64.
27
In Hilton, the Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of comity with regard to
foreign judgments. Id. at 227-28. In essence, the Court defined comity as a presumption in support of the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments and established several prerequisites to the application of comity. See Hon. Richard E. Ransom
et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A Roundtable Discussion of
Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239, 251 (1993) (listing the Hilton requirements for the use of comity). The prerequisites are as follows: 1) the foreign
court must have had subject matter and personal jurisdiction; 2) the foreign judgment
must not have been fraudulently obtained; 3) basic tenets of due process must have
been observed by the foreign court; and 4) the judgment should not offend the public
policy of the enforcing state. Id. at 251-52. The Hilton Court also included a fifth requirement of reciprocity, but most states have rejected the use of this requirement. Id.
at 252.
28
Ransom et al., supra note 27, at 252.
29
Id. at 253.
30
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000) (ensuring that tribal ordinances or customs are given full force and effect in civil suits under
the Act). See infra Part III.C for a more detailed discussion of the ICRA.
26
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B. The Relationship Between Courts of the United States
and Courts of Foreign Nations
Currently, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
in the United States are dictated by the principle of comity, as enunci31
ated in Hilton v. Guyot.
For a number of reasons, however, the
United States is motivated to seek a treaty with foreign nations that
would address questions of jurisdiction and recognition of judg32
ments. First, European nations are far ahead of the United States in
addressing this issue. With the ratification of the Brussels Convention
in 1968, the principal European nations developed a rule of law that,
with few exceptions, allows for automatic recognition and enforce33
ment of judgments of other signatory states. As a result, these nations tend to be “rather stingy in extending respect to foreign judgments not covered by treaty,” and there is no exception extended to
34
U.S. judgments.
Further, on a jurisdictional level, though the Brussels Convention
prohibits some of the exacting jurisdictional practices in which individual signatory countries have traditionally engaged, the prohibition
35
only extends to those countries who are parties to the convention.
There is no similar reciprocity limit on recognition practiced by the
United States, since few states have adopted a policy that requires
reciprocity when considering whether to recognize a foreign judg36
ment. Accordingly, judgments handed down in European forums
are often recognized in U.S. courts, regardless of whether the court
31

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
33
See Brussels Convention, supra note 6, tit. III, § 1, art. 26, 1998 O.J. (C 27) at 10
(“A judgment given in a Contracting State shall be recognized in the other Contracting
States without any special procedure being required.”); id. tit. III, § 2, art. 31, 1998 O.J.
(C 27) at 11 (“A judgment given in a Contracting State and enforceable in that State
shall be enforced in another Contracting State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there . . . .”).
34
Kevin M. Clermont, An Introduction to the Hague Convention, in A GLOBAL LAW OF
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE, supra note 4, at 4.
35
See Brussels Convention, supra note 6, tit. II, § 1, art. 3, 1998 O.J. (C 27) at 4
(specifying certain jurisdictional provisions inapplicable to suits against persons domiciled in a contracting state).
36
See supra note 27 (noting that most states have rejected the reciprocity requirement); see also Stevens, supra note 12, at 129 (“[R]eciprocity has met resistance by state
legislatures, indicating that the dominant American approach to foreign judgments is
recognition and enforcement without reciprocity.’”); cf. infra p. 808 (attributing some
of the difficulties in consistently defining the permissible bounds of a public policy
exception to the fact that state courts operate in a manner largely independent of federal courts).
32
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issuing the judgment would extend the same courtesy to a U.S. judgment. In his article outlining the current state of affairs and providing an introduction to the United States’ attempts to deal with the
issues, Professor Kevin Clermont summed up the situation nicely:
“In short, Americans are being whipsawed. Not only are they still
subject in theory to the far-reaching jurisdiction of European courts
and the wide recognition and enforceability of the resulting European judgments, but also U.S. judgments tend in practice to receive
37
short shrift in European courts.”
In 1992, the United States initiated efforts to establish a worldwide convention on jurisdiction and judgments through the Hague
38
Conference on Private International Law. As these negotiations enter their thirteenth year, however, there is skepticism about whether a
treaty will be established successfully. There are a number of barrier
issues, and the cause is further complicated by the fact that, while
the United States is in a position to gain the most from the ratification of the convention, it has little bargaining power in comparison
39
to its European counterparts.
One of the barrier issues involves the concern that, as a signatory
to a multilateral treaty, the United States may be “forced to give re40
spect to distasteful foreign judgments.” This is the point at which a
public policy exception becomes an issue. The most recent proposal
by the drafting committee, dated December 2003, contains a public
policy “escape clause” in chapter III, article 7 of the document. In
its current draft form, the clause reads as follows:
A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an
exclusive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced
in other Contracting States in accordance with this Chapter. Recognition or enforcement may be refused only on the following grounds . . .
[where] recognition of enforcement would be manifestly incompatible
with the public policy of the requested State, in particular if the specific
37

Clermont, supra note 34, at 5.
This Comment is limited to discussing the necessity of establishing guidelines to
recognize the judgments of other forums. However, developing jurisdictional provisions was the accompanying goal of the Hague Convention. For general observations
on the issues surrounding jurisdiction and the interrelationship of foreign courts, see
Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203 (2001); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional
Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 89 (1999); Friedrich K. Juenger, The
American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141; Allan R. Stein, Frontiers
of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 373.
39
See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing the United States’ lack
of bargaining power in international jurisdictional negotiations).
40
Clermont, supra note 34, at 13.
38

2004]

CROSS-BORDER JUDGMENTS

807

proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with funda41
mental principles of procedural fairness of that State.

Accordingly, there are two aspects of a judgment that may be deemed
“incompatible” with public policy and thus result in a member nation’s refusal to enforce it. A judgment could be found lacking from a
procedural standpoint, or a judgment could be substantively at odds
with the public policy of the country in which enforcement is being
sought.
On a procedural level, according to the current draft of the Hague
Convention, a member nation must refuse to enforce a judgment that
42
was rendered without proper jurisdiction. The Hilton Court further
articulated procedural requirements that the United States has historically deemed essential for recognition of foreign judgments—
namely, the “opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court
of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and
under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial admini43
stration of justice.” Though these requirements may necessitate an
analysis of the court that issued the judgment, the procedural conditions stipulated as essential for recognition of judgments are relatively
clear.
On a substantive level, the issues are more complicated. As discussed above, the current draft of the applicable Hague Convention
allows refusal where “recognition or enforcement would be manifestly
44
incompatible with the public policy of the requested State.” Such
broad language is not unique to the Hague Convention. The Brussels
Convention states that a judgment will not be recognized “if such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition
45
is sought”; the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
allows that recognition is not necessary if the action underlying the
46
judgment is “repugnant to the public policy of [the] state”; and, us41

SPECIAL COMM’N ON JURISDICTION, RECOGNITION & ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL & COMMERCIAL MATTERS: DRAFT ON EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT
AGREEMENTS 4 (Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Working Paper No. 49E,
2003), available at http://www.hcch.net/doc/workdoc49e.pdf (last visited Nov. 29,
2004) [hereinafter DRAFT DOCUMENT]. The draft clause recognizes four other reasons
for refusal. Id.
42
See Clermont, supra note 34, at 6-9 (providing a detailed description of the current Hague Convention’s provisions on jurisdiction).
43
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
44
DRAFT DOCUMENT, supra note 41, at 4.
45
Brussels Convention, supra note 6, tit. III, § 1, art. 27(1), 1998 O.J. (C 27) at 10.
46
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY -JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(3), 13 Pt. II U.L.A.
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ing parallel language, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States observes that U.S. courts do not have to recognize a
foreign judgment if “the cause of action on which the judgment was
based, or the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the
47
United States or of the State where recognition is sought.” These
rules are all subject to interpretation, and the reach of the public policy exception is by no means clear from a cursory reading of any of the
threee documents. However, one thing is evident: standing alone,
these clauses grant the enforcing courts a substantial degree of discretion.
In the United States, an additional difficulty associated with a public policy exception to recognizing foreign judgments is that—characteristic of federations, in general, and of the United States, in particular—state courts operate in a manner that is largely independent of
the federal government and of the federal court system. Currently,
the law permits states to govern their own and their residents’ interactions with foreign countries. In the context of an international convention, which is to bind the country in its entirety, there is a question
as to whether this is an appropriate approach to foreign-judgment
recognition. Specifically, the danger lies in the fact that, although the
federal government and federal courts will be bound if the convention
culminates in an agreement, the question of enforcing foreign judg48
ments only appears in federal court when there is a federal question,
49
or when diversity of citizenship requirements are met. Therefore,
the bulk of judgments to be enforced will be brought through the
state court system. While this obviously creates an independent issue
in the grand scheme of judgment recognition, for the purposes of this
Comment, the additional layer of unpredictability that would be
added to a public policy exception is the aspect that is especially worrisome.
At present, states have the power to govern the majority of courtbased interaction with foreign countries. However, it is the federal
government of the United States, not each individual state, that nego59 (2002).
47
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 482(2)(d) (1987).
48
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”).
49
See id. § 1332(a)(2)-(4) (granting federal district courts original jurisdiction of
all civil actions meeting the amount in controversy requirement where citizens or subjects of a foreign state are parties or where a foreign state is a plaintiff).
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tiates agreements with other nations. The purpose of the Hague Convention is to establish uniformity and predictability, and if the federal
government does not have the power to bind the states to a single,
national public policy standard, then the effect of any agreement will
50
be severely limited.
II. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRIBAL NATIONS AND FOREIGN NATIONS
While examining the interaction of tribal courts and state courts is
helpful in determining the most effective way to address recognition
of foreign judgments, one must note the important differences between tribal nations and foreign nations. Though it has long been
recognized that tribal nations hold a unique position with regard to
the laws of the United States, Chief Justice John Marshall pointed out
in 1831 that such special treatment does not render them the equivalent of a foreign nation:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable,
and heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that
right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet
it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be
denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect
in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile
they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States re51
sembles that of a ward to his guardian.

The legal relationship between the United States and tribal nations is
clearly atypical, requiring different treatment from that extended to
foreign nations.
In some ways, it is the differences that make the analysis all the
more effective. First, tribal courts and the courts of the United States
constantly interact with one another, largely due to their geographical
proximity and the nature of free travel and commerce in the U.S.
50

See Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws, Comparative Law, and the American Law Institute, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 391, 400 (2001) (discussing an American Law Institute project
focused on promoting a federal statute to address foreign country judgments);
Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments Convention
Project, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1306 (1998) (arguing that applying state law to a foreign
judgment runs counter to the Hague Convention’s goal of creating “uniform and predictable rules”).
51
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (denying a motion for
an injunction restraining the state of Georgia from enforcing its laws within Cherokee
Nation territory).
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Frequent interactions inject a level of urgency into the resolution of
any problem, and the necessity of finding a common ground regarding recognition and enforcement of judgments across jurisdictional
lines is no exception. Accordingly, as the world economy becomes
more global, the need to establish a standard of recognition and enforcement of judgments issued by foreign nations becomes increasingly important. Nevertheless, the treatment of foreign judgments has
yet to affect every citizen of each associated member nation to the
same degree that every Indian is affected by the way her tribe chooses
to enforce and accept the judgments coming from the surrounding
states.
Further, because many of the differences in the issues at stake are
related to the disparate size and scale of the parties involved, it is easier to imagine how a decision regarding public policy controversies
could dramatically affect the culture of a tribe. Tribal society is much
more fragile than that of the United States or of other similarly situated countries. As Professor Laurence indicated in a roundtable discussion on this topic in July 1992, “very small tribal communities are
more susceptible to being unsettled by foreign judgments than are
52
larger state communities.” The United States, whether represented
by the entire federation or by an individual state, is clearly the dominant society. Accordingly, in a case where a plaintiff is seeking enforcement of a state court judgment in a tribal forum, any public policy concern that may arise will have the potential to upset the culture
of the tribe in a dramatic and visible way. Likewise, a series of cases in
which a state court repeatedly refuses to recognize or enforce judgments issued by tribal courts may, in effect, challenge the legitimacy of
53
the tribal courts. Either occurrence could have destabilizing effects
on the tribe that is involved.
Many of the issues that arise in the relationship between tribal
courts and U.S. courts are simply a magnification of those that occur
in the interactions between courts of different countries. Despite some
of the more obvious differences, the analysis of the recognition and
enforcement of judgments at a tribal level is a useful strategy for isolating some of the most challenging issues and focusing on potential solutions.

52

Ransom et al., supra note 27, at 255.
Id. at 256 (quoting coauthor Professor Nell Jessup Newton) (“[A] state court’s
consistent refusal to enforce tribal judgments on . . . flaky grounds undercuts the legitimacy of the tribal courts . . . .”).
53
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III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
There are a number of proposed solutions and combinations of solutions to the public policy issue, only a few of which will be addressed
in this Comment.
A. Supranational Judiciary
In order to ensure that the public policy exception is construed in
the same way by all of the member nations, parties to an agreement can
take the route that the Brussels Convention has taken—reliance upon a
54
supranational judiciary that has the final say in whether a country’s
55
interpretation of a provision of the convention is appropriate. For the
European countries involved in the Brussels Convention, this has been
a successful approach, resulting in the increased mobility of judgments
between European nations and favorable comparison to the Full Faith
56
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
Many scholars have bemoaned the lack of a similar body in Hague
Convention proposals, suggesting that without it, the convention may
not be as cohesive or successful as Brussels has proven to be: “Unlike the
Brussels Convention, which benefits from a uniform interpretation provided by the European Court of Justice, Hague Conventions are implemented solely by domestic courts without guidance from a supranational
institution. Consequently, different legal systems, based on different
legal cultures, may reach diverging conclusions in interpreting the same
57
text.” However, the same disparities that may benefit from a supranational institution would also serve as impediments to its development.
A proposal to concentrate power in a supranational institution
58
would likely face overwhelming obstacles. In remarks delivered at
54

In their article on supranational adjudication, Professors Laurence Helfer and
Anne-Marie Slaughter describe “supranational” as the term “typically used to identify a
particular type of international organization that is empowered to exercise directly
some of the functions otherwise reserved to states.” Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287
(1997). They go on to define “supranational adjudication” as “adjudication by a tribunal that was established by a group of states or the entire international community and
that exercises jurisdiction over cases directly involving private parties.” Id. at 289.
55
See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M 247, 293-94 (“Where
such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to
give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.”).
56
Zekoll, supra note 50, at 1290.
57
Id. at 1286 n.16.
58
For further discussion on the idea of supranational institutions in general, see
Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV.
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New York University School of Law in 1995, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor touched upon the potential role of an international supranational judiciary, suggesting that “the vesting of certain adjudicatory
authority in international tribunals presents a very significant constitu59
tional question in the United States.” She further contended that
“Article III of our Constitution reserves to federal courts the power to
decide cases and controversies, and the U.S. Congress may not dele60
gate to another tribunal ‘the essential attributes of judicial power.’”
Accordingly, aside from any potential policy differences, the Constitution may be an impenetrable barrier to an agreement by the United
States to recognize the authority of a supranational judiciary.
In addition to the constitutional question, the redistribution of
any significant amount of power from the hands of the federal and
state courts to a judiciary that would be independent of the United
States would likely encounter a good deal of popular resistance.
Looking beyond any legal and interpretive issues that may block the
establishment of a supranational judiciary, one cannot help but consider that—for better or worse—the United States sees itself as a
unique nation, operating independently from the rest of the world.
United States citizens generally have not considered the idea of a
common geographical union with other countries, as many European
countries have, and as a result they tend to be protective of their bor61
ders and their self-identification as a “free” and democratic nation.
257 (2000) (discussing whether the U.S. Constitution would allow the transfer of judicial power to supranational tribunals); John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move
Toward Multilateral Solutions Is Changing the Character of “International” Law, 42 U. KAN.
L. REV. 605 (1994) (describing the current move toward multilateralization and the
growing conceptualization of supranational law).
59
Sandra Day O’Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 35,
42 (1995–1996).
60
Id.
61
“American exceptionalism,” a principle first presented by Alexis de Tocqueville
in Democracy in America, is the notion that America has a distinctive role in the world,
apart from other countries, with a unique sense of national purpose and destiny. See,
e.g., Tom Kando, September 11: America and the World, INT’L J. ON WORLD PEACE, Dec.
2001, at 69, 70 (arguing that the United States cannot both protect itself and remain a
respected member of the international community if it continutes to espouse American exceptionalism); Paul Starobin, Did God Bless America?, 26 NAT’L J. 2930, 2930
(1994) (tracing the history of American exceptionalism and its revival by then House
Speaker-to-be Newt Gingrich); Paul Starobin, The French Were Right, 35 NAT’L J. 3406,
3412 (2003) (examining the role American exceptionalism plays in the Iraq policy
debate between the United States and France). While the idea of American exceptionalism has been touted by all manners of politicians and patriots, see Starobin, Did
God Bless America?, supra, it has also been the source of many a critique, see Kando, supra. In an article on the changing face of international relations, Professor Daniel
Mahoney observed that “American exceptionalism leads some Americans to reject the
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For most citizens, even when they are not happy with the decisions
that the U.S. government makes, there is still a palpable degree of
pride that comes with hailing from a nation built on such a strong and
62
distinct value system. Hence, the idea of giving up any real measure
of control over what U.S. courts can and cannot decide would be unacceptable to many. Therefore, in addition to any constitutional challenges that may arise, the idea of a supranational judiciary is unlikely
to successfully pass through the court of public opinion.
B. Bilateralization
Another proposal is that each nation form separate, bilateral
agreements with other nations that are parties to the Hague Convention. The “bilateralization” proposal is a response to some countries’
desire to have the power to pick and choose which signatory nations’
63
judgments to recognize. At a conference held at New York University
School of Law, Professor Trevor Hartley suggested that, rather than ratifying an all-or-nothing convention that requires every member nation
who signs the convention to recognize judgments from every other signatory, each country that becomes a party to the agreement should
have the right to specify from which countries they will recognize judg64
ments. Professor Hartley went on to suggest that in signing the treaty,
each country’s executive could put additional conditions on the recogways of the world. In their view, the United States is too good to muddy itself in the
rough and tumble of international political life.” Daniel J. Mahoney, De Gaulle and the
Death of Europe, NAT’L INTEREST, Summer 1997, at 46, 47. For further discussion on
American exceptionalism, see SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM:
A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1996).
62
In the months leading up to the divisive presidential election of 2004, pollsters
questioned the American public about American exceptionalism:
64 percent agreed that America is generally fair and decent, while 22 percent
said it was unfair and discriminatory. And 62 percent agreed that the world
would be a better place if other countries behaved more like the United
States, while 14 percent say it would be a worse place.
Michael Barone, No, It’s Not the American Way, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 17, 2004,
at 40, 40. The results of the “fair and decent” question showed a clear divide between
Republicans and Democrats—the percentage of polled Republicans who agreed with
the “fair and decent” characterization was much higher than that of polled Democrats.
However, even in the polarized political climate that defined this time period, the
Democrats who agreed with the “fair and decent” characterization outnumbered those
who disagreed. Id.
63
Trevor C. Hartley, Accession and Bilateral Agreements, in THE HAGUE CONVENTION
ON JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 110, 110-13 (Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman eds., 2001) (defining the concept of bilateralization).
64
See id. at 113 (applying the concept of bilateralization to the proposed convention).
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65

nition of judgments. For example, as a member nation, the United
States could condition judgment recognition on reciprocity by specifying that it will only recognize judgments from those countries that have
agreed to recognize U.S. judgments. Proponents allow that such favored-nation lists will have to be amended occasionally. However, they
suggest that the power to specify which countries’ judgments a signatory
will recognize encourages member nations to review the general policies of other member nations’ courts prior to agreeing to recognize the
decisions issued by those courts. Supporters urge that this preliminary
step will solve the unpredictability and applicability problems of the
public policy exception because each signatory country will have notice
66
as to which member nations will recognize and enforce its judgments.
Critics of the proposal point to the dangers that can arise from the
“finger pointing” aspect of bilateralization, as well as complications that
would likely result from having to determine which courts are accept67
able and which courts are not. The acceptability issue is especially pertinent when one takes into consideration the very purpose, and the inherent difficulties, of a worldwide convention. By passing negative
judgment on a country’s court system, a member nation essentially says
that it does not trust that country’s legal system to enforce the same
level of justice as is enforced in other nations. While in some cases legal
systems may indeed be so fraught with corruption that this is an apt
concern, there is a danger that, in other cases, acceptance will be withheld based to some degree on misunderstandings or disapproval merely
resulting from the differences between countries’ legal systems. Further, some scholars express concerns regarding the effect that such a
selection process would have on the future—both on the relationship
between the discriminating and the discriminated countries and on the
68
future successes of worldwide agreements.
65

See id. at 112 (explaining that one country could make recognition of another
country’s judgments conditional on reciprocity).
66
See, e.g., id. at 112-13 (arguing that a country should maintain a list of nations
from which that country will recognize judgments).
67
Commenting on the aforementioned presentation by Professor Hartley, supra
note 63, Professor Kurt Siehr objected, saying that bilateralization would be a “mine
field” because of the difficulty in identifying corrupt countries and the consequences
of naming them. Discussion, Accession and Bilateral Agreements, in THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, supra note 63, at 113-14.
68
Id. at 113 (providing a further critique, Professor Siehr stated: “[W]e have to
think about the future. The psychological situation in these discriminatory and discriminated countries will be ‘We are not accepted by, say, the European countries.
Then we may do what we want, because all of these courts have said, well, we are corrupt.’”); cf. id. at 114 (agreeing with Professor Siehr, Professor Louise Lussier suggested: “[W]e should be very mindful and very cautious, and I think any discussion of
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C. “Constitution-Like” Documents and the ICRA
The third and final potential solution is the one that has the most
promise. In the context of an agreement addressing recognition and
enforcement of judgments, many of the dangers that accompany a
public policy exception can be mitigated by way of a “constitution-like”
document that outlines some nonnegotiable policies by which the involved nations have agreed to abide. The ICRA provides the best ex69
ample of this type of document.
The primary reason the ICRA was enacted was to ensure that cer70
tain individual rights are respected by Indian tribal governments.
Because the Constitution and the personal freedoms granted to individuals by the Bill of Rights do not extend to include tribal govern71
ments, the ICRA was established to constrain tribal governments and
to bind them to recognize some of the rights on which the United
States government will not compromise.
The ICRA has certainly attracted its share of criticism, especially
from those who view any limitation placed on Indians’ “self-defining
72
vision” as “a highly efficient process of legal auto-genocide.” One
author criticized the concept of any structure imposed on Indians’
right to self-govern, observing that the power of tribes to govern is
“recognized . . . only as long as the tribes’ desires are consistent with
the interests, expressed or implied, of the European-derived vision of
73
the superior sovereign.” Even the most unbiased observer must admit that the statute represents an “imposition on tribal ways of the
74
dominant society’s notions of the proper method of governing.”
However, the same scholars who recognize the drawbacks and stifling nature of the ICRA also grant that “it is a flexible statute that, the
courts have held, does not impose on the tribes the full panoply of
75
those dominant society ways.” At its most optimistic, the statute attempts to accommodate two competing goals: “preventing injustices
this sort should take into account the fact that we are talking of a worldwide convention.”).
69
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
70
Id.
71
See supra note 15 (noting that Indians were not involved in drafting the Constitution and are treated in it as a separate entity from the “several states”).
72
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219,
274.
73
Id.
74
Laurence, supra note 17, at 130.
75
Id.
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perpetrated by tribal governments, on the one hand, and, on the
other, avoiding undue or precipitous interference in the affairs of the
76
Indian people.” The ICRA seeks to establish a covenant by which
tribal governments can interact with federal and state governments. It
serves as an enumerated list of those individual rights on which the
United States will not compromise, giving real structure to the term
“public policy.”
The enumeration of individual rights undoubtedly cuts into the
ability of tribes to self-govern. In similar fashion, the Constitution cuts
into the United States’ power to govern its own citizens. In Santa Clara
77
Pueblo v. Martinez, Justice Byron White dissented from the opinion of
the Court:
The major intrusion upon the tribe’s right to govern itself occurred
when Congress enacted the ICRA and mandated that the tribe “in exercising powers of self-government” observe the rights enumerated in
§ 1302. The extension of constitutional rights to individual citizens is in78
tended to intrude upon the authority of government.

Like the Bill of Rights, the ICRA was primarily intended to protect the
rights of individual Indians from unjust intrusion on the part of their
tribal government. However, the “distinct and competing” purpose of
the Act—the furthering of Indian self-government—opened the door
79
to a mandate for interaction between tribes and the U.S.
A discernable result of the Act was to establish a set of policies to
which the Indian tribes and the United States agreed, and that—if
followed—would have the effect of ensuring that neither the tribal
80
nor the federal governments’ ability to govern is compromised. In
76

SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S.
SENATE, 89TH CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 11 (Comm.
Print 1966).
77
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
78
Id. at 82-83 (White, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 62 (majority opinion) (acknowledging the “distinct and competing” objectives behind the creation of the ICRA).
80
It is unlikely that the United States government would ever allow tribal nations
to behave in a way that negatively affected its ability to govern. See infra note 109 and
accompanying text. However, by the early 1960s, the courts had established that the
Bill of Rights did not extend to include Indians living on reservations. See Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that the Cherokee Nation was sovereign from the
United States and, therefore, not bound by the limitations imposed by the Fifth
Amendment); see also Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d
131 (10th Cir. 1959) (rejecting a First Amendment attack on a tribal court criminal
conviction for the ritual use of peyote); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958) (ruling that neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth
Amendments applied to a tribe’s imposition of a land use tax on nonmembers);
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establishing the ICRA and specifying the principles that the tribal
nations must accept, the United States did not take the extra step
and create a federal cause of action for the enforcement of rights
granted to individuals via the Act. Outside of any redress that tribal
courts or other tribal governing bodies may offer, the only federal
remedy available for violations of the ICRA is the writ of habeas cor81
pus. Careful not to undermine the tribes’ abilities to self-govern,
yet attentive to the need for balance, the federal government chose
to severely limit its ongoing influence in the day-to-day activities of
the tribal courts. Smith v. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reserva82
tion was an appeal from the United States District Court of Oregon
concerning “the comity that federal courts must accord to Indian
83
Tribal Court procedures under the Indian Civil Rights Act.” In considering whether or not the tribal court’s proceedings commenced
without undue delay, the court chose to defer to the tribal court’s
judgment:
The procedures that the Tribal Courts choose to adopt are not necessarily the same procedures that the federal courts follow. Most tribes operate their own court systems and, except to the extent demanded by the
Indian Civil Rights Act, the structure and procedure of such courts may
be determined by the tribes themselves. Federal courts must avoid undue or intrusive interference in reviewing Tribal Court procedures.
Comity towards the Tribal Courts requires that deference be given to the
84
procedures which those courts choose to follow.
Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957) (ruling that the Due Process
Clause did not apply to the acts of an Indian tribe in denying an individual the benefits
of membership). However, many were troubled by the lack of civil rights protections
for such individuals. In an article chronicling the history of the ICRA, Arthur Lazarus,
Jr. noted that “[a] Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the
American Indian, established by the Fund for the Republic, in 1961 declared that the
immunity of Indian governments from the Bill of Rights restraints jeopardizes ‘the very
assumptions on which our free society was established.’” Arthur Lazarus, Jr., Title II of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of Rights, 45 N.D. L. REV. 337, 344 (1968–1969)
(quoting COMM. ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, & RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AM. INDIAN, A
PROGRAM FOR INDIAN CITIZENS 24 (1961)).
81
This interpretation of the statute was upheld in Santa Clara Pueblo:
[I]mplication of a federal remedy in addition to habeas corpus is not plainly
required to give effect to Congress’ objective of extending constitutional
norms to tribal self-government. . . . Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and nonIndians.
436 U.S. at 65.
82
783 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986).
83
Id. at 1410.
84
Id. at 1412 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Courts often cite specifically to the ICRA as the reason for recognizing tribal court rulings and abstaining from rehearing such cases.
85
In Wetsit v. Stafne, the court declared that, from the view of the
United States federal court system, a tribal court’s fitness to try a
homicide case hinged on the ICRA: “A tribal court, which is in compliance with the Indian Civil Rights Act is competent to try a tribal
86
member for a crime also prosecutable under the Major Crimes Act.”
In Santa Clara Pueblo, Martinez, a female member of the Santa
Clara Pueblo tribe, attempted to challenge a tribal ordinance that denied tribal membership to the children of female members who marry
outside of the tribe, but not to similarly situated children of male mem87
bers. After failing to convince the tribe to alter the rule, Martinez filed
an action in District Court, on the basis that the rule was discrimina88
tory in violation of the ICRA. The United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico held that the application and interpretation of the ICRA’s equal protection clause should be left to the judgment of the tribe:
[T]he equal protection guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act should
not be construed in a manner which would require or authorize this
Court to determine which traditional values will promote cultural survival and should therefore be preserved . . . . Such a determination
should be made by the people of Santa Clara; not only because they can
best decide what values are important, but also because they must live
89
with the decision every day.

After the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s
90
holding, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Tenth Circuit decision, holding that a federal court may not pass on
91
the validity of a tribal ordinance.
Admittedly, the bargaining power between the United States and
tribal nations is skewed; the United States’ role as the dominant party
invariably affects the tribes’ ability to negotiate. However, the actions
of courts following the adoption of the ICRA suggest that, from a legal
standpoint, working together to formulate a relatively broad structure
85

44 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 825. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000), grants concurrent
jurisdiction to federal courts, exclusive of states, over Indians who commit any of the
listed offenses, regardless of whether the victim is an Indian or non-Indian.
87
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1978).
88
Id. at 53.
89
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18 (D.N.M. 1975).
90
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1048 (10th Cir. 1976).
91
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 54-55, 72.
86
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of policy guidelines by which all parties agree to abide can bridge the gap
between two distinct cultures.
It is important to note that the ICRA is not the only document that
has successfully established policy guidelines for divergent nations. Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda92
mental Freedoms essentially provides a protection of due process rights,
akin to a constitutional guarantee, and has been interpreted by courts to
93
guide the treatment of foreign judgments. Though this is obviously an
example of procedural protection, it is a good illustration of a policy requirement codified by the signatories to a multilateral convention.
IV. THE BEST APPROACH
The United States cannot maintain the stance that any judgment
deviating from protections—even constitutional protections—ex92

Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms reads as follows:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law. . . .
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights [after which five specific rights are listed, including rights related to information regarding the charge and the defense of the charge] . . . .
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228.
93
In a 2001 article, Professor Horatia Muir Watt commented on Article 6’s effect
on the public policy issues surrounding the recognition of foreign judgments:
[European] national courts are now bound, for example, to consider as part
of their public policy . . . the content of Article 6 Section 1 of the European
Convention on Human Rights; they may not . . . invoke public policy against a
decision from another European State on the grounds that jurisdiction was
exercised on the sole basis of the claimant’s nationality, or that it afforded
protection to a national intellectual property right.
Horatia Muir Watt, Evidence of an Emergent European Legal Culture: Public Policy Requirements
of Procedural Fairness Under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 539, 552
(2001) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Perez v. France, App. No. 47287/99, [2004]
ECHR 71, at ¶ 80, at http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2004/71.html (“[T]he
effect of Article 6 is . . . to place the ‘tribunal’ under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant . . . .”); Jokela v. Finland, 2002-IV Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1, 22 (“The Court must ascertain whether the overall proceedings, including the
way in which evidence was dealt with, were fair within the meaning of Article 6 § 1. This
provision places the domestic tribunal under a duty to conduct a proper examination . . .
without prejudice [as to relevance].”), available at http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/
ECHR/2002/452.html.
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tended to the American people should be denied recognition on the
basis of public policy. Instead, like the ICRA, which attempts to give
structure and boundaries to policy differences between the U.S. and
tribal governments, and like the European Convention, which protects human rights by setting out standards to which signatories must
adhere, the member nations to the Hague Conference must draft an
explicit agreement. This agreement should strike a compromise between competing points of view, respect the complexity of the various
cultural norms involved, and dictate relatively specific situations in
which it would be permissible to use the public policy escape clause.
In order to further the process, the United States must formulate
a short list of the policies on which they are unable to compromise,
keeping in mind that their goal is not to impose the dictates of the
Constitution on other member nations, but to determine which policies, if violated, would compromise fundamental U.S. beliefs and have
a distinct and chilling effect on a direct U.S. interest. In order to respect global public policy considerations, the U.S. should deny recognition based on internal public policy only where a violation is so severe as to interfere with the ability of the country to maintain its legal
94
Further, when a court determines that a judgment falls
culture.
within an identified public policy exception, the court should be re95
quired to engage in additional analysis. Such analysis should exam96
ine the U.S. interests at stake and their associated vulnerabilities.
Finally, any policy enumerations must be based on federal, not
state, policies and dictated on a national, not state-by-state, basis. The
97
Supreme Court decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins rejecting
federal general common law has been interpreted to establish that the
law applicable to judgments enforcement in United States federal
courts is state law. Therefore, enforcement and recognition of judg94

See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 256 (Md. 1997) (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (“This libel judgment obtained by one British resident against another British
resident was not a ‘serious injustice’; it does not violate fundamental notions of what is
decent and just; and it does not undermine public confidence in the administration of
law.”); see also id. at 257 (advocating a balancing test with “interest in good will, comity,
and res judicata fostered by recognition of foreign judgments” on one side and “interest in giving the benefits of our local . . . policy to residents of another country” on the
other).
95
For a thorough example of the analysis in which courts currently engage when
determining public policy, see id. at 248-51 (majority opinion).
96
See Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALI:
Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75
IND. L.J. 635, 644-45 (2000) (explaining that United States interests should be identified in order to meaningfully comprehend the public policy defense).
97
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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ments are governed by the laws of the fifty states. Both courts and
98
commentators have noted the problems inherent in this system.
99
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court held
that a question concerning the effect of an act of state “must be
100
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.” However, there is a
line drawn between an “act of state” and the more conventional en101
forcement of judgments according to “foreign decrees or statutes.”
The argument made by the Second Circuit in Republic of Iraq v. First
National City Bank with respect to the United States’ need to uniformly recognize an act of state is also salient to the foreign judgment
issue:
It is fundamental to our constitutional scheme that in dealing with other
nations the country must speak with a united voice. It would be baffling
if a foreign act of state intended to affect property in the United States
were ignored on one side of the Hudson but respected on the other; any
such diversity between states would needlessly complicate the handling
of the foreign relations of the United States. The required uniformity
can be secured only by recognizing the expansive reach of the [Sabbatino] principle . . . that all questions relating to an act of state are ques102
tions of federal law . . . .

If the current “act of state” doctrine were extended to recognition of
foreign judicial acts, any exceptions to recognition on the basis of
public policy would be more consistent and predictable.
In sum, the United States, and every other country involved in the
compilation of a public policy document such as the one proposed
here, needs to choose its issues carefully and fight the battles that it
makes sense to fight, while recognizing and respecting that other
98

See, e.g., Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (E.D. Ark.
1973) (“It is observed that suits of this kind necessarily involve to some extent the relations between the United States and foreign governments and for that reason perhaps
should be governed by a single uniform [federal common law] rule.”); Adolf Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 384-85
(1970) (finding a judicial power to create federal common law in “some matters affecting the nations’ foreign relations”); Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1605-07 (1966) (discussing the differences between interstate recognition of judgments and international
recognition); Violeta I. Balan, Comment, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in the United States: The Need for Federal Legislation, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 229, 253-54
(2003) (advocating the enactment of “federal uniform legislation” addressing the recognition of foreign judgments).
99
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
100
Id. at 425.
101
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat’l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1965).
102
Id. at 50-51 (internal citations omitted).
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countries’ concerns may differ. In his dissent in Telnikoff v. Matusevitch,
Judge Howard Chasanow of the Maryland Court of Appeals spoke to
this sentiment:
There should be no question about the need for First Amendment
protection for a United States news wire service . . . . There is a huge difference between giving First Amendment protection to a United States
news wire service and giving First Amendment protection . . . to all English libel defendants. It is unwarranted to simply refuse, on the basis of
freedom of the press and Maryland public policy, to enforce all English
libel judgments. . . . It should not violate our public policy to recognize
[England’s] interest [in protecting its residents from defamatory statements] as long as it does not endanger our interest in the free dissemination of information by our media and those people shielded by our Con104
stitution.

It is sometimes difficult to determine whether two nations’ conflicting
public policies threaten one another or whether, though different,
they can coexist despite fielding different forums. However, successfully recognizing the differences is key to establishing a judgment recognition policy with which all parties are content.
Even though public policy issues have been a barrier to the ratification of a Hague Convention, there is a body of work that suggests that,
if nations are able to overcome their differences in this arena and implement a treaty, the perception and the role of public policy may actually shift in response. In essence, if we can take the first step, the very
agreement that we negotiate will offer the opportunity to change the
member nations’ take on the character of public policy. Professor Horatia Muir Watt commented on post-Brussels Convention effects:
Recent case law . . . concerning recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions shows that public policy, traditionally a vector of inward-looking national values even in
a European context, is undergoing significant transformation, so as to
become the very cornerstone of the edification of common European
values. . . . The free movement of foreign judgments . . . testifies to the
disappearance of purely national definitions and standpoints, which give
105
way to common European parameters.

In the United States, the prospect of edifying “common European
values” is not necessarily an attractive one. However, Professor Watt
argues that, in some situations, the movement toward a common public policy initiative has occurred spontaneously, as the associated na103
104
105

702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
Id. at 260 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
Watt, supra note 93, at 539-40.
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tions have strengthened their relationships with one another.
Accordingly, though some degree of high-level imposition regarding a
structured public policy stance is likely required at the outset, the
probability is that involved nations will respond to the initial push and
107
begin to come together on their own.
Of course, an integrated policy document is not the perfect solution. The weaknesses of the ICRA will be mirrored in any policy document that Hague Conference attendees draft. One of the primary concerns regarding public policy will continue to be that, just as there is
no collateral review or regimented appeal process to review whether
108
or not a decision is consistent with the ICRA, there will be no supranational body to hear the same sort of “consistency appeals” stemming
from a policy judgment that is adopted by foreign nations. Critics will
surely point out that this means the problem is just one level removed.
Though such a statement is accurate, the value of a cohesive policy
document is that it will provide a level of guidance sufficient to calm
the most divisive of public policy-related fears.
CONCLUSION
The argument for an international constitution-like document is
one that finds its beginning in an issue best categorized as domestic—the interplay between the courts of tribal nations and the courts
of the United States. This was certainly an easier negotiation than a
multinational one will be. The United States was operating from a
position of superior bargaining power, not just because of the difference in size and scope of governments, but also because tribal courts
and tribal governments operate independently since the U.S. gov109
ernment granted them that right. That in itself probably made the
106

Id. at 540-41.
Id.
108
Per the ICRA, the only potential for appeal or federal review is the writ of habeas corpus. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
109
The relationship between tribal nations and the U.S. government is premised
upon broad federal constitutional power over Indian affairs. The sources of federal
powers over Indian affairs are many, including the Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 3, cl. 2 (granting Congress the power to dispose of and regulate U.S. territory and
property); the Indian Commerce Clause, id. art. I., § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes”); the Treaty Clause, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the national government exclusive authority to enter into treaties); the Supremacy Clause, id. art. VI, cl. 2;
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the broad
authority to execute enumerated powers). For a more detailed discussion on the
source and scope of federal authority in Indian affairs, see FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK
107
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thought of concessions on some policy issues more palatable to the
U.S.
The situation in which the United States currently finds itself is
quite different. As discussed above, the nation’s bargaining position is
not a strong one. The United States certainly does not exercise the
same level of control over its peers at the Hague Conference as it does
over tribal governments. This makes it much more difficult for the
government and the judiciary to agree to relinquish any significant
measure of control over the actions of the courts and accept and enforce the policies of other nations, which may run counter to our own.
However, that is what must be done. In 1918, Justice Benjamin Cardozo provided a fitting assessment of the situation:
Our own scheme of legislation may be different. We may even have no
legislation on the subject. That is not enough to show that public policy
forbids us to enforce the foreign right. . . . If a foreign statute gives the
right, the mere fact that we do not give a like right is no reason for refusing to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to him. We are not so
provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we
110
deal with it otherwise at home.

Unless an overwhelming policy reason validates an alternative action,
the United States must be prepared to respect and recognize other nations’ laws, even if such laws are different from those existing in the U.S.
Today, in addition to the logic articulated by Justice Cardozo, we
must also consider the broader consequences of maintaining the
status quo. At the outset of this Comment, I noted the ever-increasing
urgency with which we must pursue a solution to the problem of foreign judgments. Our failure to codify a policy thus far is a grave inefficiency and a barrier to the growth of the global economy. I have
advanced what I believe to be a valid answer, a cohesive policy document, to one of the issues that is causing the stalemate, but it is only
one step toward resolution. As it becomes more and more common
for legal problems to expand beyond the borders of an individual nation, there is an increased need for countries to find a solution that
ensures stability and predictability. The failure to do so will have
negative consequences to international relations and the worldwide
economy. It is vital that the countries of the world work together to
111
overcome their differences, or we will all suffer.
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

207-28 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982).
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
111
See Traynor, supra note 50, at 403 (identifying the need to find “harmonious,”
“noncombative,” and “cooperati[ve]” approaches to solving international conflict of
laws problems).
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